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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
third persons involved in the agency relationship other than
article 3010, which makes mandataries liable to such persons
in their individual capacities. Since it is reasonable to assume
that principals are more likely to be financially responsible than
their agents, the solution contemplated by this article appears
untenable in a modern commercial society. In view of Louisiana's
need for a doctrine analogous to the common law concept of
apparent authority, it seems that the result reached in Dixie
Parking Service was the correct one, despite the court's ques-
tionable application of codal authority. It is submitted that it
would be more desirable for the courts, in applicable cases, to
apply common law principles as their source for apparent author-
ity-at least until the Louisiana Civil Code can be revised so as
to embrace an equivalent concept.
Kenneth R. Williams
THE RIGHT OF THE INDIGENT CLIENT TO SUE His COURT-APPOINTED
ATTORNEY FOR MALPRACTICE
The assistance of counsel has been afforded the accused in
federal criminal prosecutions for several decades.' The Supreme
Court of the United States first guaranteed the indigent's right
to counsel in all state felony prosecutions (via the fourteenth
amendment) in Gideon v. Wainwright.2 The recent decision in
Argersinger v. Hamlin3 provided that in all criminal prosecu-
tions, including misdemeanors, no incarceration could flow from
a conviction of a crime unless the defendant is afforded the
assistance of counsel. Attorneys will as a result defend increas-
ing numbers of indigent clients who are a diversion from and
burden to their regular practice. It is a reasonable inference
from this fact that the instances of professional malpractice
may increase at least proportionately to the corresponding in-
crease in representation of indigent clients. The concern of this
Note is the isolation and examination of the civil remedies
available to the indigent client to redress the wrong caused by
his attorney's incompetence.
We must begin, however, with the remedies for incom-
petent counsel within the framework of the criminal proceed-
1. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1937).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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big, as the nature of post-conviction relief in criminal proceed-
ings provides the contrast against which the viability of the
civil remedies is brought into focus. It is well-established that
a defendant has grounds for post-conviction relief for incom-
petent counsel if the assistance of counsel is perfunctory and
for the sake of form alone. 4 The test for determining the lack
of effective counsel is rather vague and is most commonly enun-
ciated as follows:
"There can be held to be lack of effective counsel only
when it appears that the assistance of counsel was so grossly
inept as to shock the conscience of the court and make the
proceedings a farce and mockery of justice. '5
Moreover, "success is not the test of the effective assistance
of counsel."
Hence, although post-conviction relief for lack of effective
counsel is possible, the standard for such relief has yet to be
stated with clarity, and at best requires a heavy burden of proof
by the client of his attorney's flagrant incompetence. The writer
submits that what post-conviction relief is available is an inade-
quate remedy for redress of the harm suffered.
The traditional civil remedy for incompetent counsel is suit
in tort for negligence.7 There has been no jurisprudence in Lou-
isiana or elsewhere barring the indigent from bringing a tort
action in state court. The issue as such has been exclusively the
subject-matter of federal litigation; these decisions have dis-
missed indigent actions brought for the malpractice of their
court-appointed attorneys under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
The rationale of the typical plaintiff's complaint in these actions
4. See 253 F. Supp. 805 (D. Colo.), affkd, 363 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1966);
Cofield v. United States, 263 F.2d 686 (9th Cir. 1959).
5. See Busby v. Holman, 356 F.2d 75, 79 (5th Cir. 1966). See also United
States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965); Bouchard v. United States,
344 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1965); Lyons v. United States, 325 F.2d 370 (9th Cir.
1963); Rivera v. United States, 318 F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1963).
6. See Wood v. United States, 357 F.2d 425, 427 (10th Cir. 1966). See also
Silva v. Cox, 351 F.2d 61 (10th Cir. 1965); DeRoche v. United States, 337
F.2d 606 (9th Cir. 1964); Lucero v. United States, 335 F.2d 912 (10th Cir.
1964); Holt v. United States, 303 F.2d 791 (8th Cir. 1962); Hester v. United
States, 303 F.2d 47 (10th Cir. 1962).
7. Thompson v. Lobdell, 7 Rob. 369 (La. 1844); Breedlove v. Turner,
9 Mart.(O.S.) 353 (La. 1820).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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has been that the defendant attorney, acting under color of state
law as court-appointed counsel, deprived the indigent plaintiff
of his civil rights through his incompetence in handling the
plaintiff's case. Most federal courts have dismissed these com-
plaints upon the grounds that court-appointed attorneys, al-
though officers of the court, do not act under color of state lawY
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this statutory inter-
pretation in Mulligan v. Schlachter;l0 the other courts of appeal
have differed in their dispensation of actions brought under the
Civil Rights Act. The Third Circuit has consistently said that
such a claim "amounts to no more than a tort claim for mal-
practice and as such is not cognizable under the Civil Rights
Act."" The Fourth and Fifth Circuits have predicated their
affirmation of the district court's dismissal upon the doctrine
of executive immunity. 12 This doctrine is based upon the prin-
ciple that potential tort liability of government officials would
unduly interfere with the operation of government functions.18
The application of executive immunity to court-appointed attor-
neys is of fairly recent origin. In Sullens v. Carroll,14 the dis-
trict court dismissed the plaintiff's action brought under the
Civil Rights Act upon the grounds that the court-appointed
attorney's alleged malpractice was not an act done under color
of state law. Plaintiff refiled, basing jurisdiction upon diversity
of citizenship. In affirming the lower court's dismissal of the
second suit, the court held that "court-appointed counsel . . . in
federal criminal cases are immune from suit the same as
federal officers."' 15 The court relied upon Jones v. Warlick,16 a
1966 Fourth Circuit decision, as authority for the proposition
9. Woods v. Virginia, 320 F. Supp. 1227 (W.D. Va. 1971); Vance v.
Robinson, 292 F. Supp. 786 (W.D.N.C. 1968); Reinke v. Richardson, 279 F.
Supp. 155 (E.D. Wis. 1968); Jackson v. Hader, 271 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Mo.
1967); Pritt v. Johnson, 264 F. Supp. 167 (M.D. Penn. 1967); Pugliano v.
Staziak, 231 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. Penn. 1964). All of these actions arose out
of state prosecutions.
10. 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968).
11. Fletcher v. Hook, 446 F.2d 14, 16 (3d Cir. 1971). See also Smith v.
Clapp, 436 F.2d 590 (3d Cir. 1970), though the basis of this holding is unclear,
as there are many torts cognizable under the Civil Rights Act, and the
court offers no criteria for distinguishing professional malpractice from
those that do create a federal cause of action.
12. Sullens v. Carroll, 308 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d
1392 (5th Cir. 1971); Jones v. Warlick, 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966).
13. Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1949).
14. 308 F. Supp. 311 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff'd, 446 F.2d 1392 (5th Cir. 1971).
15. 446 F.2d at 1392.
16. 364 F.2d 828 (4th Cir. 1966).
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that court-appointed attorneys (in federal cases) are immune
from suit for conduct within the scope of their official duties.
The import of these decisions is that a near absolute bar
has been erected against indigent suits of this nature in federal
courts. Not only is the alleged incompetence of the attorney
outside the scope of the Civil Rights Act as consistently inter-
preted by the courts, but at least two courts of appeal have held
that court-appointed attorneys are absolutely immune from tort
liability for their official acts as a matter of law, regardless of
jurisdictional questions. An analysis of the viability of that
doctrine of immunity is critical to the purposes of this Note.
In Jones v. Warlick,17 the earliest decision on point, the
indigent plaintiff sued the federal district judge, an FBI agent,
and his court-appointed attorney for conspiring to deprive him
of his right to a fair trial. The district court found the defendant
attorney immune, as well as the judge and the FBI agent. The
Fourth Circuit based its affirmation of the lower court's dis-
missal upon the Supreme Court decision in Barr v. Matteo.18
Barr, which remains the leading case with regard to executive
immunity, held the head of an executive agency in the federal
government immune from civil suit for libel for statements
made within the scope of his official duties. The principles
enunciated in Barr have rational application to the FBI agent;
moreover the Federal judge is certainly immune by virtue of
the long-standing doctrine of judicial immunity.'9 But it is
unclear how this doctrine of immunity can be consistently ap-
plied to court-appointed attorneys in light of the purposes of
the doctrine as defined by the jurisprudence. The doctrine
evolved from the cognition that the public interest often de-
mands official action that might result in tortious liability; hence
the doctrine rescues officials of government from this dilemma-
the public interest on the one hand and their private interest
in avoiding lawsuits on the other. It is unclear how this conflict
of interests evolves within the attorney-client relationship. The
public interest in due process and the attorney's interest in
avoiding a malpractice suit are both fulfilled by the competent
17. Id.
18. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
19. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Bradley v. Fischer, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 335 (1871).
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legal representation of the indigent by the attorney. Because
the public interest which dictated his appointment does not
require that the attorney act contrary to the interests of his
client, the traditional justification for the doctrine of immunity
is absent in its application to the attorney-client relationship.
Rather than immunity, the potential tortious liability of the
court-appointed attorney would serve to encourage that com-
petent representation by him, a constitutional as well as a social
imperative.
Furthermore, the previous jurisprudence notwithstanding,
a recent Supreme Court decision has provided a sound consti-
tutional basis for suit by the indigent against his court-appointed
attorney. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics,20 the plaintiff brought a civil suit
against six federal agents for violation of his fourth amendment
rights by a warrantless entry and search of his apartment with-
out probable cause. The district court dismissed the suit upon
the ground that 1) it failed to state a federal cause of action
and 2) the agents were immune by virtue of executive im-
munity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiff
had a federal cause of action directly under the fourth amend-
ment for which damages are recoverable:
"Finally we cannot accept respondent's formulation of
the question as whether the availability of money damages
is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment. For we
have here no explicit congressional declaration that per-
sons injured by a federal officer's violation of the Fourth
Amendment may not recover money damages from the
agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the eyes of Congress. The question is
merely whether petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury
consequent upon the violation by federal agents of his
Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress through a
particular remedial mechanism normally available in the
federal courts .... Having concluded that petitioner's com-
plaint states a federal cause of action under the Fourth
Amendment, . . . we hold that petitioner is entitled to
20. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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recover money damages for any injury he has suffered as a
result of the agent's violation of the amendment." 21
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion elaborated upon the
court's holding: "I am of the opinion that federal courts do have
the power to award damages for violations of 'constitutionally
protected interests.' "22
The Court did not pass upon the question of immunity in
reaching its decision. The Constitution being the fundamental
law of the land, it is a reasonable interpretation of the court's
omission that the doctrine of executive immunity will not protect
those who violate constitutional imperatives. Bivens may thus
be distinguished from Barr, i.e., in Barr the cause of action was
not predicated upon the violation of a constitutionally protected
interest.
Reasoning by analogy from Bivens, an indigent client should
have a cause of action directly from the sixth amendment,
irrespective of the doctrine of immunity as applied in Jones and
Sullens. The jurisprudence concerning the right to counsel 2s
quite clearly confers to that right the status of a constitutionally
protected interest, i.e., the assistance of counsel is so funda-
mental to the purposes of justice that no individual should be
deprived of it solely because of his economic circumstances.
Hence its violation in federal criminal cases should create for
the indigent client a federal civil action, basing jurisdiction upon
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) .24
Assuming, however, the indigent is allowed his day in court,
the question remains as to the burden of proof he must sustain
in order that damages may be recovered. Due to the novelty of
this question, the rather heavy burden of proof required in
criminal proceedings is at present the only constitutional test
for deprivation of the right to counsel. The criminal test should
be inapplicable to the civil action contemplated here; whereas
society's interest in order and public safety as prosecuted in the
21. Id. at 397.
22. Id. at 399.
23. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 835 (1963).
24. "The district court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 10,000
dollars, exclusive of interest or costs, and arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
criminal proceeding may justify the heavy burden of proof
following conviction, this interest is absent in civil litigation
between private individuals. It is suggested that the indigent
plaintiff should instead be required to sustain the traditional
burden of proof for a civil action for negligence.
The final consideration with regard to the indigent's civil
remedy for his attorney's malpractice is a matter of the ethical
considerations which serve to characterize the practice of law
as a profession rather than a business. Canon Six of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provides "a lawyer shall not
attempt to exonerate himself from or limit his liability to his
client for his personal malpractice." The doctrine of immunity
violates the spirit if not the letter of this canon. The principle
of the personal responsibility of the attorney to his client is a
cornerstone of the legal profession, and it would be ignoble to
compromise this principle with regard to indigents.
As noted before, there is no jurisprudence in Louisiana
or other jurisdictions barring the indigent from suing his court-
appointed attorney for malpractice. For the- same reasons that
recommend the rejection of the doctrine of immunity in the
federal courts, it is submitted that such a development in state
courts might compromise the basic principles by which we
conceive of our profession and our system of justice itself.
Charles Joseph Yeager
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